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Abstract:  Developing countries have been facing substantial adjustment costs in their endeavor in 
implementing trade reform. To lessen the adjustment costs of trade reform and to diffuse political support 
for protection a uniform tariff policy has often been recommended. The present paper examines the 
efficacy of this policy in terms of a 3×4 specific factor full-employment structure reasonable for a 
developing economy. It shows that whether a symmetric tariff structure would be able to protect all the 
import-competing sectors crucially depends on the economy’s trade pattern. The paper is then extended to 
include Harris-Todaro type unemployment of unskilled labour. In this framework also the implications of 
the uniform tariffs and then welfare effects of tariffs on one sector have been studied. Finally, the 
consequences of tariffs on urban unemployment of unskilled labour have been examined. 
 
Keywords: Full-employment, specific factor, uniform tariffs, Hechscher-Ohlin subsystem, skilled labour, 
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TARIFF STRUCTURE IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY: A 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
 
1.    Introduction: 
 
Economic liberalization means a closer international integration of production and markets. The increasing 
interdependence of economies around the world is the result of growing trade and capital flows and rising 
inter-firm technology cooperation. These trends reflect the liberalization of trade initiated by successive 
GATT rounds, and especially in the 1980s, the worldwide deregulation of financial markets and other 
business services such as banking and insurance. The multilateral agreement and the formation of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), resultant of the Uruguay round of discussions, have brought about 
revolutionary changes in liberalizing international trade across countries whether developed or developing. 
Radical measures for reducing tariff barriers and completely doing away with non-tariff barriers to ensure 
freer global trade have already been undertaken in manufacturing commodities
1 that are intensive in the use 
of capital or skilled labour. Liberalization involves both inflow of foreign capital as well as reduction of 
protection of domestic industries, structural reforms like deregulating the labour market and integrating the 
domestic market with the world market. 
 
However, a wide variety of potentially disadvantageous short-run outcomes would invariably result from 
trade liberalization. These outcomes include a reduction in employment and output, the loss of industry-
specific and firm-specific human capital, and macroeconomic instability resulting from balance of 
payments difficulties or reductions in government revenue. These adjustment costs are positively correlated 
with the extent of structural rigidities prevalent in the liberalizing countries. 
 
Available empirical evidence strongly suggests that the adjustment costs associated with trade reform have 
been alarmingly high in many developing economies. Although, many of the Sub-Saharan African 
countries have been subjected to IMF-imposed reforms for a decade or more, yet the overall performance 
of these economies remains remarkably poor, despite considerable progress on liberalization and 
deregulation. The average annual growth of real GDP in these countries fell from 2.5 per cent between 
1985-89 to 1.9 per cent between 1990-97. During the 1990s, per capita income has also declined in most of 
Africa’s less developed countries (UNCTAD 2000). In South Africa and in many of the Latin American 
countries, trade liberalization during 1990s was associated with falling employment and hence economic 
insecurity for the formal sector labour force. Liberalizing low income countries have experienced 
                                                           
1 However, the attempt to subject agricultural commodities to disciplines similar to those that govern trade 
in manufactures has not so far been successful. Moreover, in agriculture, exports from developing countries 
remain severely hampered by massive domestic support and export subsidy programs in developed 




significant volatility in terms of the population of firms and that this has almost certainly had a 
disproportionate impact on labour (Kaplinsky 2001). Moreover, wage inequality between skilled and 
unskilled labour has increased significantly in Latin American Countries (Wood 1997). In spite of high 
growth rates in many regions of the world, there has been little dent in the number of people living in 
absolute poverty. Some regions, notably sub-Saharan-Africa, South Asia and Central Asia have 
experienced sharp rises in the number of the absolutely poor, just as their participation in the global 
economy was deepening. Relative poverty during this period has also increased (Kaplinsky 2001). United 
Nations development Program (UNDP) Human development report suggests a striking increase in inter-
country inequality as globalization advanced rapidly. Most seriously, as noted by Kaplinsky (2001), trade 
reform measures have made the developing economies increasingly reliant on external economic events. In 
recent decades, this external environment has become increasingly volatile. The volatility of both capital 
flows and GDP growth was much greater in developing countries than in the industrial countries 
(Hausmann and Gavin 1996). Besides, the costs of this volatility were greater for developing than 
industrialized countries. More developing countries experienced currency crises than industrial countries, 
and with a greater negative impact on output (IMF 1998).   
 
On the other hand, it has been observed that some developing countries, notably the non-OECD countries, 
are relatively slow in carrying out tariff reforms compared to other countries, although they have opted for 
the policy of free trade as their development strategy. Also there have a few cases where some countries, 
which initially implemented tariff reform vigorously, had to increase the tariff rates at least for the time 
being.
2 There are both economic and political reasons behind the sluggishness of tariff reforms. One such 
explanation is provided by the tariff-jumping  theory
3 that suggests a positive correlation between the 
amount of FDI in a country and tariff rate imposed by it. There is no doubt that the major driving force 
behind FDI by the multinational corporations (MNCs) in the developing countries are the higher rates of 
return on their capital in these countries vis-à-vis in the international market. Countries with protected 
domestic markets are likely to attract foreign investment, but only for the purpose of jumping the tariff 
walls and reaping a good harvest by serving their markets directly. On the contrary, reductions of import 
tariffs imply larger volumes of imports, lower rates of return to capital and smaller amounts of FDI in these 
countries. So, the countries in quest of foreign capital may be reluctant in implementing tariff reform 
seriously.  Another strong argument in favour of keeping up with tariff is related to its employment 
generating and preserving effects, which is especially important for the developing countries with a 
significant proportion of unemployment in its total labour force. It is usually argued that a tariff reduction 
would immediately lead to an increase in unemployment since displaced workers cannot readily be 
absorbed in other sectors of the economy. This view is quite popular and acceptable to many political 
                                                           
2 For example, Pakistan, in October 1995, implemented a series of major economic measures, including 
imposition of additional import duties designed to improve the trade balance, which had deteriorated 
sharply following implementation of trade liberalization programs in the initial phase of reforms. 




parties in these countries. Most importantly, a few recent theoretical works like Chaudhuri and Mukherjee 
(2002a) and Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002b) have shown that some countries may endeavor tariff 
reforms slowly because tariff reductions may directly lead to deterioration of the welfare of these 
economies. Chaudhuri and Mukherjee (2002a) show that in a production structure appropriate for a 
developing economy there may be cases where reduction in import tariff directly leads to deterioration in 
welfare in the presence of labour market distortion. They have developed a three-sector general equilibrium 
model with two informal sectors where there is complete mobility of labour between these two sectors and 
assumed a positive relationship between wage income and labour's efficiency. In this scenario, the paper 
shows that tariff reform may not be desirable due to its adverse impact on welfare. Chaudhuri and 
Mukhopadhyay (2002b) have also reached the same broad conclusion in terms of a two-sector general 
equilibrium model with an informal sector. Besides, in Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2002b) it is shown 
that the welfare impact of removal of protectionist policy crucially depends on the trade pattern of the 
relevant country and that the Wage efficiency hypothesis is neither necessary nor sufficient for deriving the 
counterintuitive result relating to tariff reform. On the contrary, for tariff reform to be welfare deteriorating 
the presence of the labour market distortion is a necessity. These theoretical results suggest the view that 
owing to the presence of labour market distortion, adjustment costs of trade reform have been higher in 
developing countries vis-à-vis developed countries. 
  
From the above discussions, it is clear that many of the developing countries have been encountering 
serious problems in their task of adjusting to an environment of internal and external competition 
stimulated by trade liberalization measures like deregulation, the opening up of the overall economy, and 
reduction of tariffs. Several industrial units have had difficulties in adjusting to more competitive market 
conditions due to influx of commodities from other countries at cheaper rates. As a consequence, numerous 
of these units had to be shut down, leading to a substantial increase in unemployment level. It, therefore, 
appears that longer timeframes for implementation of tariff reduction commitments should be granted to 
these countries and some degree of protection in some key industries is necessary until the domestic 
industries can successfully withstand foreign competition. To lessen the adjustment costs of trade reform a 
uniform tariff policy, long favored by the IMF and the World Bank as a means of diffusing political support 
for protection has often been recommended. Panagariya and Rodrik (1993) have formalized the argument. 
They note that a key advantage of a uniform tariff structure is that it would minimize lobbying by special 
interests for protection because it diffuses the benefits of protection. If the only way protection can be 
increased is by increasing protection for all industries, lobbying for protection then yields only dispersed 
benefits as well as costs. Then a uniform tariff creates a free-rider problem for the interests seeking 
protection. However, this view is acceptable only if a uniform tariff structure can protect all the import-





The present paper examines the validity and generality of the above view in terms of a 3×4 specific factors-
full-employment model reasonable for a developing economy. It is closely related to Marjit (1993) paper. 
Marjit (1993) in a 3×3 specific factors-full-employment framework has shown that a symmetric tariff 
structure may fail to protect all the import-competing sectors. The model that Marjit (1993) has considered 
contains a Heckscher-Ohlin sub-system (HOSS), which uses the same two factors of production. The result 
of Marjit (1993) crucially hinges on the assumption that the specific factor (SF) model contains one subset 
of the economy displaying HO properties. However, we shall study the same aspect in a SF full-
employment model, which does not contain a HOSS. We focus on one of the typical industrial structure 
with an intermediate good sector of a developing economy. This industrial structure cannot be captured by 
Marjit’s model. We consider a 3×4 specific factors-full-employment model consisting of an intermediate 
good-producing sector (sector 1) which is used in another sector (sector 3) along with unskilled labour to 
produce a final commodity. There is another sector-specific input − skilled labour, which is used in another 
sector (sector 2) along with capital to produce another final commodity.  Finally, the intermediate good is 
produced using capital and unskilled labour. The prices of the two final commodities and the intermediate 
good are given internationally. We will show that if commodities 1 and 2 (or 2 and 3) are the two 
importables of the economy the imposition of tariffs at a uniform rate will lead to a contraction of the sector 
that uses the specific input and thus fails to protect both of the import-competing sectors of the economy. 
So the result of Marjit (1993) can be proved in a SF model even when it does not contain a HOSS. 
However, if both of the final commodities (i.e. commodities 1 and 3) are the two importables of the 
economy, then uniform tariffs leads to an expansion of both the import competing sectors at the cost of a 
contraction of the intermediate good-producing sector. Then we have proceeded to analyze the welfare 
effect of tariffs on one sector. The model has then been extended into the Harris-Todaro (HT) framework 
and the same procedure (first, the uniform tariffs, and then tariffs on one sector) has been followed. Finally, 
we have explained as to why some of the results differ between the competitive and the HT economies. 
 
2.    The Model: 
 
We consider a small open economy consisting of three sectors. Sector 2 produces a crucial input (say, 
fertilizer) for sector 3 with the help of unskilled labour and capital. Sector 1 is the specialized 
manufacturing sector, which produces its output using skilled labour and capital. Finally sector 3 produces 
its product using unskilled labour and the intermediate input (fertilizer) produced by sector 2. So capital is 
mobile between sectors 1 and 2 and unskilled labour is mobile between sectors 2 and 3. But skilled labour 
is specific to sector 1. Owing to our small open economy assumption we consider all the three product 
prices to be given internationally. The economy described above roughly resembles a developing country. 
The markets are perfectly competitive. Production functions exhibit constant returns to scale (CRS) with 




about the trade pattern of the economy. We shall only assume that two of the three goods are importables
4 
and the remaining one is an exportable. 
 
The following symbols will be used in the equations. 
aKi = capital-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 1,2; 
aLi = unskilled labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i = 2,3; 
aS1 = skilled labour-output ratio in sector 1; 
aF3 = fertilizer-output ratio in sector 3; 
Pi = world price of the ith good, i = 1,2,3; 
WS = wage rate of skilled labour; 
W = wage rate of unskilled labour; 
r = return to capital; 
L* = endowment of unskilled labour; 
S* = endowment of skilled labour; 
K* = capital stock of the economy; 
Y = national income at world prices; 
dti = a small ad-valorem tariff imposed on the i
th commodity, i = 1,2,3; 
M = aF3.X3 − X2 = the volume of import of the traded intermediary (commodity 2). 
 
A general equilibrium of the system is represented by the following set of equations: 
WS.aS1 + r.aK1 = P1                                                                                                                         (1) 
W.aL2 + r.aK2 = P2                                                                                                                          (2) 
W.aL3 + P2.aF3 = P3                                                                                                                         (3) 
aS1.X1 = S*                                                                                                                                     (4) 
aK1.X1 + aK2.X2 = K*                                                                                                                      (5) 
aL2.X2 + aL3.X3 = L*                                                                                                                       (6) 
 
We have six equations (1 – 6) to solve for six unknowns – WS, W, r, X1, X2 and X3. The three factor prices 
are determined from equations (1–3), independent of factor endowments. Once the factor prices are known 




                                                           
4 Since the production technology exhibits CRS, the domestic supply curves of importables are horizontal. 
If the corresponding world prices are below (above) it, the domestic production (import) will be zero. Thus 
it is implicitly assumed that in the initial equilibrium the domestic production sectors supply the whole 
amount of importables domestically demanded under the world prices equal to the height of the domestic 




2.1  The effects of a uniform tariff structure: 
 
We are now interested to study the effects of imposition of tariffs on different import-competing sectors. At 
the very outset we do not consider any specific trade pattern for the economy. We shall study the effects of 
a uniform tariff under all the three possible trade patterns of the economy. Suppose that initially we do not 
have any tariff. So world prices and domestic prices are equal. Now a small ad valorem tariff dti > 0 is 
imposed on the ith commodity, i = 1,2,3, starting from an initial ti = 0. 
Differentiating equations (1-3) and using the envelope conditions we get 
θS1. S W ˆ  + θK1.r ˆ  = dt1                                                                                                                 (7) 
θL2.W ˆ  +.θK2.r ˆ  =  dt2                                                                                                                 (8) 
θL3.W ˆ  + θF3.dt2 = dt3                                                                                                                  (9) 
where, the circum flex denotes proportional change and θji is the share of the j
th input in the total value of 
production of the i
th commodity for j = L, S, K and i = 1, 2, 3.  Arranging equations (7 - 9) in a matrix 
notation and solving by Cramer’s rule we get 
W ˆ  = (1/∆).θS1.θK2.(dt3 − θF3.dt2)                                                                                                (10) 
S W ˆ  = (1/∆).[θL3.(dt1.θK2 – dt2.θK1) + (dt3 − θF3.dt2).θK1.θL2]                                                      (11) 
r ˆ = (1/∆).[θL3.θS1.dt2 − (dt3 − θF3.dt2).θS1.θL2]                                                                            (12) 
where, ∆ = θL3.θS1.θK2  >  0. 
 
Let us first consider the case where the intermediary is the export commodity and the two final 
commodities are the importables of the economy. In this case, a small uniform tariff in the ad valorem 
fashion on the two importables implies that dt1 = dt3 = dt and dt2 = 0. From (10 – 12) we get 
W ˆ  = (1/∆).θS1.θK2.dt  >  0;  
S W ˆ  = (1/∆).[θL3.θK2 + θK1.θL2].dt  >  0;                    
r ˆ = − (1/∆).θS1.θL2.dt  <  0. 
 
So if commodities 1 and 3 are the two importables of the economy, uniform tariffs raise the two wage rates 
and lower the rental to capital. As a consequence, aS1 will fall and aK1 will rise since the producers in 
industry 1 will be willing to adopt more capital-intensive technique of production relative to the skilled 




sector 1. As aK2 also rises as (W/r) has gone up, for sector 1 to get more capital sector 2 must contract. This 
also releases more unskilled labour to sector 3 as aL2 has gone down. Sector 3 also expands as unskilled 
labour is also fully employed. So we have the following proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1: In the given production structure, if the two final commodities are the importables 
of the economy the imposition of a uniform tariff, dt > 0, starting from an initial ti = 0 is able to protect 
both the sectors. 
 
The clue behind proposition 1 is that sectors 1 and 3 do not have any common mobile factor between 
themselves. So both of them can expand following the imposition of uniform tariffs at the cost of the 
intermediate good sector without hurting each other.  
 
Now suppose that good 1 and 2 are the importables of the economy. So for a uniform tariff on commodities 
1 and 2 we have dt1 = dt2 = dt and dt3 = 0. From (10-12) we have 
W ˆ  = − (1/∆). (θS1.θK2.θF3).dt < 0 
S W ˆ  = (1/∆).[θL3.(θK2 − θK1) − θF3.θK1.θL2].dt 
r ˆ = (1/∆).[θL3 + θF3.θL2].θS1.dt  > 0 
( S W ˆ  – r ˆ) = (1/∆).[θL3.θK2 − θL3 − θF3.θL2].dt   <  0. 
Since ( S W ˆ
 – r ˆ) < 0, (WS / r) decreases due to the imposition of a uniform on commodities 1 and 2. So aS1 
goes up implying a decrease in the production of commodity 1 since the size of the skilled labour force is 
given. Also aK1 goes down. So capital will be released from sector 1 to sector 2. As (W/r) has gone down 
the production technique will be more unskilled labour-intensive in sector 2. So aK2 decreases and aL2 
increases. As a consequence, the output in sector 2 increases but that in sector 3 goes down as more labour 
is pulled out from sector 3 to sector 2. Hence sector 2 expands while sector 1 contracts as a sequel of the 
imposition of a uniform tariff on commodities 1 and 2.  
 
It is easy to check that in this production structure, even if commodities 2 and 3 are the two importables of 
the economy we obtain the same result The clue behind this result is that both sectors 1 (3) and 2 use a 
common mobile input – capital (unskilled labour). So one sector can expand only at the cost of the other. 
This establishes the following proposition.  
PROPOSITION 2:  If commodities 1 (3) and 2 are the two importables of the economy, then due to 
imposition of uniform tariffs the intermediate good producing sector (2) expands at the cost of the final 





It should be noted that in proving the proposition that the symmetric tariff structure may fail to protect all 
the import competing sectors, unlike Marjit (1993), we do not require a production structure containing a 
HOSS.  
 
2.2    Effects of tariffs on one commodity: 
 
From the analysis of section 2.1 we find that the uniform tariffs are effective in protecting final goods 
sectors (commodities 1 and 3). But if one of the two final goods (1 and 3) and the intermediary   
(Commodity 2) are the importables of the economy, the uniform tariffs fail to protect both sectors. A 
pertinent question in this context is on which of these sectors a tariff should be imposed if protection of 
both import-competing sectors is not feasible
5 for some reasons. Let us now study the welfare 
consequences of tariff imposition on any of the three sectors of the economy. The criterion of judgment on 
the choice of tariff-imposed sector is the national income at international prices. National income will be 
able to be used as a criterion if we assume a homothetic utility function. This is because the demand 
functions of the final commodities and hence the economy’s welfare will be a function of the aggregate 
income, independent of the income distribution. The national income at world prices is given by 
Y = W.L* + r.K* + WS.S* − ∑  ti.Pi.Xi + t2.P2.M                                                                                    (13) 
                                            i = 1,3 
where M (= aF3.X3 − X2) is the volume of import of commodity 2 at the international price, P2. Here (W.L* 
+ r.K* + WS.S*) is the aggregate factor income, ti.Pi.Xi denotes the cost of protection of the i
th sector for i = 
1,3. Finally, t2.P2.M is the revenue of the government from imposition of a tariff on the import of the traded 
intermediary (sector 2).  
 
Depending on the different trade patterns of a developing economy the following three cases should be 
considered. 
Case I: dt1 > 0; dt2 = dt3 = 0. From equations (10) − (12) it follows that 
W ˆ , r ˆ = 0 and  S W ˆ = dt1/θS1. 
Now differentiating (13) with respect to t1, we get 
(dY/dt1) = (dWS/dt1).S* − P1.X1 
Inserting the value of (dWS/dt1) and after simplification one gets 
(dY/dt1)  = 0. 
 
Case II: dt2 > 0; dt1 = dt3 = 0. In this case from (10) − (12) we find that 
W ˆ = − θS1.θK2.θF3.(dt2/∆), r ˆ = (θS1/∆).(θL3 + θF3.θL2).dt2 and  S W ˆ = − (θK1/∆).(θL3+ θL2.θF3).dt2 
                                                           





Differentiation of (13) with respect to t2, substitution of the expressions for (dW/dt2), (dWS/dt2) and (dr/dt2) 
and after simplification it is easy to show
6 that 
(dY/dt2) = 0. 
 
Case III: dt3 > 0; dt1 = dt2 = 0. 
In this case also it can be verified
7 that 
(dY/dt3) = 0. 
PROPOSITION 3: If a small tariff dti > 0 is imposed on the i
th commodity, i = 1,2,3 starting from an 
initial ti = 0, it succeeds in protecting that sector. However, welfare measured by national income at world 
prices does not change due to imposition of the tariff. 
 
We explain proposition 3 as follows. The imposition of tariff on any of the three sectors of the economy 
affects incomes of different factors of production. For example, a small tariff on sector 1 (specialized 
manufacturing sector) raises only the skilled wage but does not affect the unskilled wage and the rental to 
capital. Again a small tariff on sector 3 raises the two wage rates but lowers the rental to capital. Aggregate 
factor income rises in these cases. But the imposition of tariff leads to misallocation of resources and hence 
imposes a cost on the society. However, in both the above cases, two opposite forces on welfare arise and 
these completely cancel out each other, thereby producing no net effect on welfare. On the other hand, a 
small tariff on sector 2 (intermediate good producing sector) lowers both skilled and unskilled wages but 
raises the rental to capital. Aggregate factor income declines. Bur tariff revenue increases as the volume of 
import of the traded intermediary rises. Again two opposite effects on national income are generated, which 
completely cancel out each other. 
 
Thus we find that under the above full-employment production structure if the economy decides to protect 
only one of its import-competing sectors, from the viewpoint of national welfare all the three cases are 




3.      Rural-Urban Migration and Protection:                  
 
In this section of the paper we shall proceed to extend the model into the Harris-Todaro (HT) economy. In 
an HT economy there are two broad sectors: rural and urban. While the urban sector faces a unionized 
labour market, the rural sector faces a competitive labour market. Due to the existence of rural-urban wage 
differential, rural workers migrate to the urban sector with the hope of getting jobs in the higher wage-
paying sector. In the migration equilibrium, there exists a positive level of urban unemployment because 
                                                           




the number of migrants exceeds the number of jobs in the urban sector. The equilibrium in the HT economy 
is sub-optimal because of the persistence of wage differential between the sectors and presence of 
unemployment in the migration equilibrium. It would be interesting to analyze the effects of tariff 
imposition in such an economy owing to the presence of labour market distortion and urban unemployment 
of unskilled labour.  
 
We shall assume that sector 3 is the rural or unskilled labour supplying sector and sectors 1and 2 constitute 
the two urban sectors of the economy. The urban unskilled labour earns the unionized wage W* > W, 
where W is the rural wage rate. We shall stick to the same procedure that has been followed in the full-
employment case. First the effects uniform tariffs and then tariffs on one sector will be analyzed. The 
general equilibrium of the extended model is represented by equations (1), (3-5) of section 2 and the 
following three equations. 
 
W*.aL2 + r.aK2 = P2                                                                                                                         (2.1) 
aL2.X2 + aL3.X3 + LU = L*                                                                                                               (6.1) 
(W*/W).aL2.X2 + aL3.X3 = L*                                                                                                          (14) 
 
Here equation (14) is the rural-urban migration equilibrium condition, which has been simplified by using 
the labour endowment equation given by (6.1). In (6.1) LU is the level of urban unemployment of unskilled 
labour.  
 
In this extended model also the three input prices – W, WS and r are determined independent of factor 
endowments by solving equations (1), (2.1) and (3). Once the factor prices are known the factor 
coefficients are also known. X1, X2 and X3 are then found from equations (4), (5) and (14). Finally, LU is 
obtained from equation (6.1) since aL2, aL3, X2 and X3 have already been determined. 
 
We should note that our measure of welfare in this small open economy, national income at international 
prices remains the same as before. However, W is now the rural sector wage rate and from the envelope 
property of HT framework it follows that WL* is the aggregate wage income of the unskilled labour force. 
 
3.1  Effects of uniform tariffs: 
 
Suppose that initially we do not have any tariff. Now a small tariff dti > 0 is imposed on the ith commodity, 
i = 1,2,3 starting from an initial ti = 0. Differentiating equations (1), (2.1) and (3), using the envelope 
conditions and solving we get 




S W ˆ  = (1/θS1)[dt1 − (θK1/θK2).dt2].                                                                                                       (16) 
r ˆ = (dt2/θK2)                                                                                                                                         (17) 
Totally differentiating equations (4), (5) and (6.1) and after simplification we can obtain the following 
expressions.
8 
1 ˆ X  = (θK1.σ1/θS1).dt1 − (θK1.σ1/θK2.θS1).dt2                                                                                                                                    (18)         
2 ˆ X = (1/λK2).[− (λK1.σ1/θS1).dt1 + {(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2)/θK2.θS1}.dt2]                                     (19)         
3 ˆ X  = (1/λL3).[{W*.λL2.λK1.σ1/W.λK2.θS1}.dt1 − dt2.{(W*.λL2.θF3/W.θL3) + (W*.λL2.σ2/W) 
                + (λL3.θF3.σ3/θL3) + (W*.λL2/W.λK2).(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2/θK2.θS1)} 
                + dt3.{(W*.λL2/W.θL3) + (λL3.θF3.σ3.θL3)}]                                                                         (20)       
 
Now subtraction of  (7) from (6) yields 
LU = ((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2 
Totally differentiating this equation and using (15), (17) and (19) one can easily derive the following 
expression.
9 
LU. U L ˆ  = − (W*/W).(aL2.X2/θL3).dt3 − {((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2.λK1.σ1.dt1/λK2.θS1} 
                          + dt2.[(W*.aL2.X2.θF3/W.θL3) + ((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2 .σ2)  
                                + {((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2.(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ1} / λK2.θK2.θS1]                          (21) 
 
Let us study the effects of the uniform tariffs in this framework. Depending on different trade patterns we 
consider the following three cases. 
Case I: dt1 = dt3 = dt > 0. So, W ˆ ,  S W ˆ  > 0; and, r ˆ = 0. From equations (18)−(20) one can easily check that 
1 ˆ X  > 0;  2 ˆ X  < 0; and  3 ˆ X  > 0. We explain these results as follows. As (WS/r) rises aS1 decreases. As a 
consequence, X1 increases as the skilled labour is fully utilized. The capital-output ratio in sector 1, aK1, 
increases. So the usage of capital in sector 1 rises. Sector 2 now gets less capital than before which leads to 
a decrease in X2. As W rises, the rural-urban wage differential falls. Also a decrease in X2 lowers the 
expected urban wage rate. The consequence will be a reverse migration of workers from the urban to the 
rural sector. The rural sector (sector 3) expands, as it now gets more labour than before. So if commodities 
1 and 3 (both final commodities) are the importables of the economy, the uniform tariffs are able to protect 
both the sectors. 
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Case II:  dt 1 = dt2 = dt > 0; and, dt3 = 0. Here W ˆ  = − (θF3/θL3).dt < 0; r ˆ = (dt/θK2) > 0; and,  S W ˆ = 
((θK2−θK1)/θK2.θS1).dt. From (18)−(20) we find that 1 ˆ X  < 0;  2 ˆ X  > 0;  3 ˆ X < 0. The symmetric tariffs 
imposed on commodities 1 (final commodity) and 2 (intermediary) lowers (WS/r), (W/r) and (W*/P2) 
ratios. More labour intensive techniques will be used in production of all the three sectors. As a 
consequence, aS1, aL2 and aL3 rise and aK1 and aK2 fall. As skilled labour is a specific input in the production 
of commodity 1, X1 falls following an increase in aS1. A contraction of sector 1 releases capital to sector 2, 
leading to its expansion. Sector 2 now employs more unskilled than before. On the other hand, a reduction 
in the rural sector wage rate, W, and an increase in the number of jobs in the urban manufacturing sector, 
will lead to more migration of unskilled labour to the urban sector. The rural sector (sector 3) contracts 
following a shortage of unskilled labour.  
 
Case III: dt2 = dt3 = dt > 0; and, dt1 = 0. In this case W ˆ  = dt > 0; r ˆ = (dt/θK2) > 0; and,  S W ˆ = − 
(θK1.dt/θK2.θS1) < 0; (W ˆ −r ˆ) = − (θL2/θK2).dt; ( S W ˆ − r ˆ) = − (dt/θK2.θS1) and, (W ˆ − dt2) = 0. From (18)−(20) 
we find that 1 ˆ X = − dt.(θK1.σ1.θL2/θK2.θS1) < 0;  2 ˆ X = dt.{(λK1.σ1+ λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2)/(θK2.θS1λK2)} > 0; and, 
3 ˆ X = dt.(W*.λL2 /W.θL3.λL3).[(1 − θF3 − σ2) − {(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2).θL3.λL3/(λK2.θK2.θS1)}]. 
So,  3 ˆ X  < 0 if (θF3 + σ2) ≥ 1.  
The following proposition follows immediately. 
PROPOSITION 4: In a Harris-Todaro type economy, the uniform tariffs can protect both the import-
competing sectors if the two final commodities are the importables of the economy. However, if specialized 
manufacturing sector and the intermediary are the two importables, the specialized manufacturing sector 
contracts due to uniform tariffs. On the other hand, if the intermediary and the agricultural commodity are 
the importables of the economy, uniform tariffs fail to protect both sectors if (θF3 + σ2) ≥ 1. 
 
Thus we find that the uniform tariffs can protect both import-competing final goods sectors but fail to do so 
when one of the sectors is an intermediary. So this result is found to be valid irrespective of the framework 
of analysis, whether full-employment or Harris-Todaro framework. 
 
3.2  Tariffs on one sector 
 
Let us now analyze the effects of tariff on any one of the sectors in an HT economy. Depending on 
different trade patterns of a developing economy the following three cases are to be considered. 




W ˆ ,  r ˆ = 0 and  S W ˆ = (dt1/θS1) > 0. Then from (18) − (20) we have,  1 ˆ X  > 0; 2 ˆ X < 0;and,  3 ˆ X > 0. Also 
from (21) it follows that  U L ˆ < 0. Now differentiating (13) with respect to t1, we get 
(dY/dt1) = (dWS/dt1).S* − P1.X1 
Inserting the value of (dWS/dt1) and after simplification one gets 
(dY/dt1)  = 0. 
 
We can explain these results as follows. As WS rises with W and r remaining unchanged, the (WS/r) ratio 
increases. So producers in this sector now use more capital-intensive technique than before. As aS1 falls, 
and skilled labour is a specific input in this sector, the output of this sector increases. An expansion of 
sector 1 means that less capital will now be available to sector 2. Sector 2 contracts as a consequence and 
there would be a reverse migration of labour from the urban to the rural sector. The rural sector expands 
both in terms of employment and output. The level of urban unemployment of unskilled labour decreases as 
the number of workers returning to the rural sector and getting absorbed in this sector is greater than the 
magnitude of fall in urban employment. Besides, the imposition of a small tariff on the specialized 
manufacturing product (commodity 1) creates another distortion (apart from the existing labour market 
distortion) in the economy. This raises the skilled wage rate and leaves the other factor prices unaltered. 
The increase in domestic factor income is exactly neutralized by the protectionary cost of tariff. Hence, the 
national income measured at international prices remains unaffected. 
 
Case II: dt2 > 0; dt1 = dt3 = 0. In this case from (15) − (17) we find that 
W ˆ = − (θF3/θL3).dt2  < 0; r ˆ = (dt2/θK2) > 0;and,  S W ˆ = − (θK1/θK2.θS1).dt2 < 0. Using (18)−(20) we can write 
1 ˆ X < 0;   2 ˆ X > 0; and, 3 ˆ X < 0. Besides, from (21) we get  U L ˆ  > 0. Differentiating (13) with respect to t2 
one can show
9 that (dY/dt2) < 0. These results can intuitively be explained in the following way. As r 
increases and WS decreases, aS1and aK1 take higher and lower values, respectively than before. Since there 
is full employment of skilled labour, the level of production in sector 1, X1 falls. Thus, capital will be 
released for sector 2. X2 rises as aK2 has fallen and the capital stock of the economy is fully utilized. As X2 
increases the level of employment of unskilled labour in that sector also rises. As the urban sector 
employment level increases and the rural sector wage decreases, there will be an increase in migration of 
labour from the rural to the urban sector. So, the rural sector gets less labour than before and as a 
consequence, the rural sector output, X1, falls. Also the new migrants will outnumber the magnitude of new 
jobs created in the urban sector. So, the level of urban unemployment of unskilled labour rises. When a 
small tariff is imposed on commodity 2 only, both the skilled and unskilled wage rates go down and the 
rental rate on capital goes up. In this case, the tariff on the intermediate good producing sector also enables 
the government to earn certain amount of tariff revenue. The sum of increase in the rental income and the 
                                                           




tariff revenue is outweighed by the sum of decrease in the skilled and unskilled wages. As a consequence, 
the economy’s welfare measured by national income at international prices falls.  
 
Case III: dt3 > 0; dt1 = dt2 = 0. In this case, W ˆ =  (dt3/θL3) > 0; r ˆ,  S W ˆ = 0. From (18) − (21) it then follows 
that  1 ˆ X  = 0;  2 ˆ X = 0; 3 ˆ X  > 0; and  U L ˆ  < 0. Differentiation of equation (13) with respect to t3 yields: 
(dY/dt3) > 0. In this case only the rural sector wage rises. As the skilled wage and rental to capital do not 
change, aS1, aK1, aK2 do not change. So the output levels of sectors 1 and 2 do not change. However, as the 
rural sector unskilled wage, W, rises, there will be an increase in supply of labour in this sector, thereby, 
leading to an expansion of this sector both in terms of output and employment. Urban unemployment of 
unskilled labour falls as some of the previously unemployed workers now move to the rural sector due to 
an increase in the rural sector wage rate. There will be two opposite effects on welfare. As W rises, total 
wage income of unskilled labour (and hence aggregate factor income) rises. But the expansion of sector 3 
means an increase in the cost of tariff protection of this sector. However, it can be easily shown
10 that the 
first effect dominates over the second effect. The net result will be an increase in welfare of the economy. 
Thus we have the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 5: Let dti > 0 be the small tariff imposed on the i
th import competing sector, starting 
from an initial ti = 0, i = 1,2,3. Then (a) urban unemployment of unskilled labour falls while the welfare of 
the economy remains unaffected if i = 1, i.e. if the tariff is imposed on sector 1; (b) urban unemployment 
level increases and the economy’s welfare decreases if i = 2, i.e. if the tariff is imposed on sector 2; (c) 
urban unemployment decreases and welfare improves if the tariff is imposed on sector 3. 
 
So if national welfare is the sole criterion of judgment on the choice of tariff-imposed sector, if the rural 
sector produces an importable and a tariff is imposed on this sector, welfare of the economy improves 
unequivocally. Besides, a tariff on sector 3 also lowers the magnitude of the urban unemployment, which is 
also one of the important goals for policy discussions in developing economies. 
  
A close inspection of the results presented in the form of different propositions reveals that some of the 
results hold irrespective of the framework of analysis. More specifically, results relating to uniform tariffs 
are valid both in the full-employment and Harris-Todaro (HT) frameworks. On the contrary, welfare effects 
of tariffs on single commodities differ significantly between the two frameworks. A competitive model is 
Pareto optimal and free trade is the best policy for a small open economy. On the other hand, the HT 
framework is sub-optimal because in the migration equilibrium there exists a positive amount of 
unemployment in the urban sector and the urban-rural wage gap continues to persist. The root cause behind 
the sub-optimality of the HT equilibrium is the presence urban labour market distortion in the form of 
unionized wage. Imposition of a small tariff on any sector in a competitive model creates two effects. First, 
                                                           




aggregate factor income changes, secondly, the cost of tariff protection affects welfare. In a competitive 
model imposition of any distortion in the form of a small tariff on any sector of the economy cannot affect 
welfare measured by national income at world prices because the above two opposite effects completely 
cancel out each other. So the net effect of a small tariff imposition starting from ti = 0, leaves welfare 
unchanged. On the contrary, welfare effect of imposition of tariff on any sector in an HT economy crucially 
hinges on the extent of wage differential between the urban and rural sectors in the two equilibrium 
situations. If the wage differential increases, as in case of tariff imposition on sector 2 (intermediary), the 
greater will be the cost of distortion and the lesser will be the economy’s welfare. When a small tariff is 
imposed on sector 1, the competitive unskilled wage in the rural sector does not change and so would be 
the urban-rural wage differential. Again, if a small tariff is imposed on sector 2 welfare decreases. Finally, 
a small tariff on sector 3 starting from a zero level, leads to an increase in the competitive unskilled wage 
rate, thereby lowering the unskilled wage gap between the sectors. Hence, welfare unambiguously 
improves. 
    
4.     Concluding Remarks: 
 
Implementation of trade reform at a fast pace has not so far been proved to be an unmixed blessing for 
many developing countries. Available empirical evidence suggests that the adjustment costs associated with 
trade reform have been alarmingly high in many developing economies. Reductions in tariff rates 
indiscriminately and vehemently have led to serious disconcerting effects like closure of several industrial 
units and substantial increases in unemployment levels in many developing countries. So tariff reform 
should be implemented in a phased manner and some degree of protection in some key industries is 
necessary until the hitherto protected domestic industries can successfully withstand foreign competition. 
To lessen the adjustment costs of trade reform a uniform tariff policy, long favored by the IMF and the 
World Bank as a means of diffusing political support for protection has often been recommended. 
However, this view is acceptable only if a uniform tariff structure can protect all the import-competing 
sectors of a developing economy.  
 
The present paper examines the validity and generality of the above view in terms of a 3×4 specific factors- 
model reasonable for a developing economy. The production structure of the economy is as follows. There 
is an intermediate good-producing sector (sector 2), which is used in another sector (sector 3) along with 
unskilled labour to produce a final commodity. There is another sector-specific input - skilled labour, which 
is used in another sector (sector 1) along with capital to produce another final commodity.  Finally, the 
intermediate good is produced using capital and unskilled labour. We have first studied the effects of 
uniform tariffs and then tariffs on one sector. The effects of tariffs have been analyzed in both competitive 





In this set-up it has been found that uniform tariffs are effective for protecting the two final goods sector (1 
and 3). However, when commodity 1 (commodity 3) and the intermediate good (2) are importables, the 
uniform tariffs fail to protect both of the sectors. We have then proceeded to find out the sector on which a 
tariff should be imposed from the viewpoint of national welfare. We have then extended the model into the 
Harris-Todaro economy, and followed the same procedure.  
 
The analysis of the paper has found that under this production structure which resembles a less developed 
economy. If commodities 1 and 2 (or 1 and 3) are the importables of the economy, the uniform tariffs will 
lead to a contraction of the sector that uses the specific input and thus fails to protect both the import-
competing sectors of the economy. Besides, the present paper has shown that if both the final commodities 
(i.e. commodities 1 and 3) are the two importables of the economy, then a uniform tariff structure leads to 
an expansion of both the import competing sectors at the cost of a contraction of the intermediate good-
producing sector. Thus, whether a uniform tariff structure is appropriate for protecting the import-
competing sectors crucially depends on the trade pattern of the country. Then we have tried to find out on 
which of these sectors a tariff should be imposed from the viewpoint of national welfare. We have then 
extended our model by introducing Harris-Todaro type unemployment of unskilled labour and tried to 
follow the same procedure. In the HT economy too it has been found that the uniform tariffs are able to 
protect both sectors if the two final commodities are the importables of the economy. But if the government 
cannot protect both the import-competing sectors due to some reasons, then tariff must be imposed on the 
agricultural commodity. In that case national income increases and the urban unemployment decreases. Our 
analysis also suggests that in the given production structure if a small tariff is imposed on the sector which 
uses a specific factor and does not use unskilled labour (e.g. sector 1), the urban unemployment of 
unskilled labour will fall while the welfare remains unaltered. On the contrary, if a small tariff is imposed 
on the intermediate-input producing sector, the economy’s welfare deteriorates and the urban 
unemployment problem aggravates. Free trade is the optimal policy for a small open economy. However, if 
a minimum dose of protection has to be imposed, in the given production structure of this paper, it must be 
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APPENDIX I:  Full-employment framework: Effect of tariff imposition on welfare 
 
Case I: dt1 > 0; dt2 = dt3 = 0 ⇒ W ˆ , r ˆ= 0;and,  S W ˆ  = (dt1/θS1)                                                (A.1) 
(dY/dt1) = (dWS/dt1).S* − P1.X1 = (WS.S*/θS1) − P1X1 = (WS.aS1.X1.P1/WS.aS1) − P1.X1 = 0       (A.2) 
 
Case II: dt2 > 0; dt1 = dt3 = 0. So from (10) − (12) it follows that 
W ˆ  = − θS1.θK2.θF3.(dt2/∆)  , r ˆ=  (θS1/∆).[θL3 + θF3.θL2].dt2; and 
S W ˆ = − (θK1/∆).[θL3 + θL2.θF3].dt2                                                                                                                                (A.3)                
Note that ∆ = θS1.θK2.θL3  > 0.  
Differentiating (14) one gets 




After substituting the values of   (dWS/dt2), (dW/dt2) and  (dr/dt2) from (A.3) we get 
(dY/dt2) = − (WS/∆).S*.(θL3 + θL2.θF3).θK1 − (W/∆).L*.θS1.θK2.θF3 + (r/∆).K*.(θL3 + θF3.θL2).θS1 + P2.M 
               = (1/∆).(θL3 + θF3.θL2).[r.K*.(aS1.WS/P1) − WS.S*.(aK1.r/P1)] − (W/∆).L*.θS1.θK2.θF3 + P2.M 
               = (1/∆).(θL3 + θF3.θL2).r.θS1.aK2.X2 − (W/∆).L*.θS1.θK2.θF3 + P2.M 
              = (θS1.θK2/∆).[P2X2θF3.θL2 − WL*.θF3 + P2.X2.θL3] + P2.M 
             = (θS1.θK2/∆).[W.θF3.(aL2.X2 − aL2.X2 − aL3.X3) + P2.X2.θL3] + P2.M 
             = (θS1.θK2/∆).[(P2X2.W.aL3/P3) − (W.aL3.X3.P2.aF3/P3)] + P2.M 
             = (θS1.θK2.θL3/∆).P2.(X2 − aF3.X3) + P2.(aF3.X3 − X2) 
             = 0. 
 So, (dY/dt2) = 0.                                                                                                                 (A.4) 
 
Case III: dt3 > 0; dt1 = dt2 = 0. 
From (10) − (12) we get 
W ˆ  =  (θS1.θK2  /∆).dt3  , r ˆ= −  (θS1.θL2/∆).dt3; and 
S W ˆ = − (θK1/θL2/∆).dt3                                                                                                                                                  (A.5) 
(dY/dt3) = (dWS/dt3).S* + (dW/dt3).L* + (dr/dt3).K* − P3.X3 
After putting the expressions for (dWS/dt3),. (dW/dt3), (dr/dt3) from (A.5) we get 
(dY/dt3) = (WS.θK1.θL2.S*/∆) + (W.L*.θS1.θK2/∆) − (r.K*.θS1.θL2/∆) − P3X3 
               = (θS1.θL2/∆). {(P1X1.r.aK1/P1) − r.K*} + (WL*.θS1.θK2/∆) − P3.X3 
                = − (θS1.θL2/∆).r.aK2.X2 + WL*.(θS1.θK2/∆) − P3X3 
                 =  (θS1.θK2/∆).({WL* −   P2X2.(W.aL2/P2)} − P3X3 
                  = (θS1.θK2/∆).W.aL3.X3 − P3.X3  
                  = (θS1.θK2.θL3/θL3.θS1.θK2).P3.X3 − P3X3  = 0. 
 Thus, (dY/dt3) =  0.                                                                                                                         (A.6)  
 
 
APPENDIX II: Harris-Todaro Framework 
Uniform Tariffs: 
 
Differentiating equations (1), (2.1) and (3) and solving we get the following expressions. 
r ˆ=  (dt2/θK2); W ˆ  =  [(dt3/θL3) − (θF3/θL3).dt2];and, 
S W ˆ = (dt1/θS1) − (θK1/θK2.θS1).dt2.                                                                                                 (A.7)                   
Now from (A.7) it is easy to derive the following expressions. 




( S W ˆ −r ˆ) = {(dt1/θS1) − (dt2/θK2.θS1)} 
(W ˆ − dt2) = (dt3/θL3) − (θF3 /θL3).dt2 − dt2 = (dt3/θS1) − (dt2/θL3) 
Differentiating equation (4) one can derive 
1 ˆ X  = (θK1.σ1/θS1).dt1 − (θK1.σ1/θK2.θS1).dt2                                                                                    (18)     
Now differentiating equation (5) and using (A.8) the following result can be easily derived. 
2 ˆ X = (1/λK2).[− (λK1.σ1/θS1).dt1 + {(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2)/θK2.θS1}.dt2]                                    (19)   
Again differentiating equation (6.1) we get 
λL3. 3 ˆ X  = (W*/W).(λL2.W ˆ − λL2. 2 ˆL a − λL2. 2 ˆ X ) − λL3. 3 ˆL a  
              = (W*.λL2/W).{(dt3/θL3) − (θF3.dt2/θL2) + (W*.λL2.θK2.σ2/W).(W ˆ − r ˆ) + λL3.θF3.σ3.(W ˆ − dt2) 
                            − (W*.λL2/W.λK2).[− (λK1.σ1.dt1/θS1) + {(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2).dt2/θK2.θS1}] 
Using (A.7) and (A.9) the following expression can be obtained. 
3 ˆ X  = (1/λL3).[{W*.λL2.λK1.σ1/W.λK2.θS1}.dt1 − dt2.{(W*.λL2.θF3/W.θL3) + (W*.λL2.σ2/W) 
                + (λL3.θF3.σ3/θL3) + (W*.λL2/W.λK2).(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2/θK2.θS1)} 
                + dt3.{(W*.λL2/W.θL3) + (λL3.θF3.σ3/θL3)}]                                                                         (20) 
 
From (6) and (7) one gets the following expression. 
LU = ((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2                                                                                                           (A.8) 
Differentiation of (A.8) yields 
dLU = − (W*/W
2).aL2.X2.dW + ((W*/W) − 1).(daL2.X2 + aL2.X2) 
or, LU. U L ˆ  = − (W*/W).aL2.X2.W ˆ  + ((W*/W) −1).aL2.X2.( 2 ˆL a +  2 ˆ X ) 
Using (A.7) and (19) the above expression may be rewritten as 
LU. U L ˆ  = − (W*/W).(aL2.X2).{(dt3/θL3) − (θF3/θL3).dt2}  
             + ((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2.[σ2.dt2 − (λK1.σ1.dt1/λK2.θS1) {(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2)/λK2.θK2.θS1}.dt2] 
LU. U L ˆ  = − (W*/W).(aL2.X2/θL3).dt3 − ((W*/W) − 1).(aL2.X2.λK1.σ1/λK2.θS1).dt1 
                      + dt2.[(W*/W).aL2.X2.(θF3/θL3) + ((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2.σ2  
                              + ((W*/W) − 1).aL2.X2.{(λK1.σ1 + λK2.θL2.θS1.σ2)/λK2.θK2.θS1}]                           (21) 
 
Effects of tariff imposition on one commodity 
 
Welfare implication of tariff imposition on one commodity is to be considered here. Depending on different 
trade situations we consider three cases. 




From (A.7) it follows that W ˆ , r ˆ= 0; and,  S W ˆ = (dt1/θS1) > 0. 
Differentiating (13) with respect to t1 we get 
(dY/dt1) = (dWS/dt1).S* − P1.X1 = (WS.aS1.X1/WS.aS1).P1 − P1.X1 = 0 
From (21) it follows that 
U L ˆ  < 0 i.e urban unemployment level decreases when dt1 > 0; dt2 = dt3 = 0. 
 
Case II: dt2 > 0; dt1 = dt3 = 0. 
From (A.7) it follows that r ˆ= (dt2/θK2) > 0;  S W ˆ = − (θK1.dt2).(θK2.θS1) < 0; W ˆ = − (θF3/θL3).dt2. 
From (21) it follows that  U L ˆ  > 0. 
Differentiating (13) with respect to t2 one gets 
(dY/dt2) = (dW/dt2).L* + (dr/dt2).K* + (dWS/dt2).S* + P2.M  
Insertion of the values of (dW/dt2), (dr/dt2), (dWS/dt2) and M yields 
(dY/dt2) = − WL*.(θF3/θL3) + (rK*/θK2) − (WS.θK1.S*/θK2.θS1) +,P2.(aF3.X3 − X2) 
              = (P2.aF3/aL3).(aL3.X3 − L*) + (P2/aK2).(K* − aK2.X2 − aK1.X1) 
              = − (P2.aF3/aL3).(W*.aL2.X2/W) < 0 
 
Case III: dt3> 0; dt1 = dt2 = 0. 
From (A.7) we have W ˆ  =  (dt3/θL3); and, r ˆ, S W ˆ = 0. 
From (21) one gets  U L ˆ  < 0. 
Now differentiation of Y with respect to t3 yields 
(dY/dt3) = (dW/dt3).L* + (dr/dt3).K* + (dWS/dt3) − P3.X3 = (WL*/θL3) − P3.X3 = (P3/aL3).(L* − aL3.X3) 
               = (P3/aL3).(W*/W).aL2.X2 > 0.  